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Inclining the columns to make the temple look 
straight: a first glance at monetary indicators 
on university–industry cooperation 
Joaquín M Azagra-Caro, Gérard Carat and  
Dimitrios Pontikakis 
The analysis of university–industry cooperation (UIC) rarely considers the geographic implications of 
its promotion. We hypothesise that UIC may lead to a cumulative advantage of already good 
performers. The 6th EU R&D Framework Programme is a useful source to verify this hypothesis 
because of its a priori neutrality regarding UIC. Using original data on the funding allotted per 
participant, we build national indicators of the value of FP6-sponsored UIC across the EU27. The 
results confirm that richer countries involved in UIC get more funds than poorer countries. We discuss 
the role of policy in light of the apparent entry barriers in UIC. 
HIS ARTICLE TRIES to shed further light on 
two research questions at the intersection of 
cumulative advantage and asymmetries in 
access to public R&D funding: 
• Do richer countries involved in university–
industry cooperation (UIC) get more funds from 
the European Union (EU) than poorer countries 
involved in UIC?  
• Do EU-funded UIC agreements get more funds 
than other kinds of agreement? 
To address these questions, we use data from the 6th 
EU R&D Framework Programme (FP). The FPs are 
a well-known source of data for inter-country com-
parisons of UIC (Geuna, 1998; Caloghirou et al, 
2001) and the presence of geographical disparities 
and cumulative effects across EU member states 
(Luukkonen, 2001) — although sometimes with the 
opposite finding, that is, a higher involvement of 
smaller member states (Capron and Cincera, 2007). 
While information about funding flows is not public, 
our institute, the Institute for Prospective Techno-
logical Studies, has access to funding data which, 
compared to other studies using FP data, has the ad-
vantage of showing not only the number of partici-
pations and the project’s overall budget but also the 
amount of money allotted to each participant. The 
relevance of money per participant is that it allows 
for the construction of indicators about the value of 
the participations. 
There are good reasons to engage in this type of 
research. Improving links between universities and 
firms is among the key societal needs and policy 
targets, so the measurement of the phenomenon has 
raised considerable attention. Both actors have in-
centives to engage in cooperation. 
For instance, firms may be interested in coopera-
tion with universities because of the economic bene-
fits of publicly funded research: increasing the stock 
of knowledge, training skilled graduates, creating 
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new instrumentation and methodologies, forming 
networks and stimulating social interaction, creating 
new capacity for scientific and technological  
problem-solving, creating new firms and providing 
social knowledge (Martin and Tang, 2007).1 Coop-
eration increases firms’ organisational learning ca-
pability, and thus their innovation performance 
(Alegre and Chiva, 2008). 
Universities may be interested in cooperation with 
firms, among other reasons, to get access to public 
funding. Actually, policy-making in OECD countries 
has considerable reliance on UIC as a motor of re-
gional clustering and innovation (Harding, 2007). 
Critiques have always accompanied the promotion 
and rise of UIC in the sense that: 
an excessive emphasis on the mission of the 
university to satisfy immediate societal needs 
may compromise other missions, notably the 
fundamental knowledge production function 
that underpins future innovation and economic 
development. (Romero, 2008) 
However, case studies suggest that high-quality sci-
entific production is reinforced by UIC (Van Looy et 
al, 2004; Lebeau et al, 2008), at least with high-
quality UIC and up to a threshold — when the funds 
obtained through these activities do not exceed 15% 
of the researcher’s total budget (Manjarrés-
Henríquez et al, 2008). Symmetrically, low-level 
UIC may lead to unimportant scientific activities up 
to the point of deteriorating already poor research 
systems (Vega-Jurado et al, 2007). This allows pos-
tulating the existence of a Matthew effect in UIC 
(Van Looy et al, 2004), which makes sense because 
UIC is led by scientific prestige, even more than by 
monetary rewards (Azagra-Caro et al, 2008). This 
can be the case in Europe, where the tradition of aca-
demic entrepreneurs has been linked to career devel-
opment, more than in USA, where the role of 
strengthening intellectual property rights and spin-off 
has been more relevant (Franzoni and Lissoni, 2007). 
In addition to theses interdependencies between 
scientific prestige and UIC, there are various  
specific reasons to think that UIC is subject to cumu-
lative advantage. First, there is a learning process 
that facilitates those faculty members who started 
UIC to repeat the experience and finally concentrate 
most of the collaborations (Hoye and Pries, 2009). 
Second, scientific productivity appears to go hand-
in-hand with patented industrial applications by uni-
versity researchers (Meyer, 2006; Wong and Singh, 
2009). Third, excellent universities in regions with 
low absorptive capacity may cooperate with firms 
from other territories (Azagra-Caro et al, 2006) in 
the search for advanced technological standards  
(Azagra-Caro, 2007). In these other regions with 
higher absorptive capacity, proximity may be 
enough for cooperation among local actors (Castro 
et al, 2008), so firms will benefit from universities 
within and outside the region, reinforcing their  
previously winning position. This may be true even 
at national level, since UIC is an international activ-
ity, requiring resources that can compete at that level 
(Geoghegan and Pontikakis, 2008), which poorer 
countries may not have. 
Verifying the existence of cumulative advantage 
in the case of UIC at national level is an open ques-
tion. There is of course a problem of measurement 
because of lack of data and standardised indicators. 
Existing studies on university–industry links tend to 
rely on non-monetary indicators, such as citations to 
public research found in firm research papers  
(Tijssen and Van Leeuwen, 2006) or university–
industry co-authorship of papers (Tijssen et al 
2009), and in ad hoc groups of countries. 
The existing literature rarely offers many ele-
ments of comparison between the funding of UIC 
and other modalities of research, that is, not involv-
ing UIC. It is thus difficult to understand, for in-
stance, whether UIC is more appealing in public 
calls for tenders for universities and firms than other 
modalities of research. Hence our second research 
question on whether publicly funded agreements that 
imply UIC may get more funds than other kind of 
agreements. It would be remarkable, given that the 
reality of companies is somewhat different, as the 
results derived from the 4th Community Innovation 
Survey show: in EU27, universities are not an  
important cooperation partner for innovative  
companies, except for a few member states such as 
Finland, Slovenia and Sweden (Eurostat, 2007). 
Context of the research 
Apart from the financial data, the use of the 6th EU 
R&D FP (FP6, in short) has an additional advantage 
for our research: its neutrality regarding UIC by  
design. 
First, the goal of the FP6, similarly to previous 
FPs, is to: 
further the objective set out in Article 163(1) of 
the Treaty, of strengthening the scientific and 
technological bases of Community industry and 
encouraging it to become more competitive at 
international level, while promoting all the re-
search activities deemed necessary by virtue of 
other Chapters of this Treaty. (EC, 2002a) 
In short, the aim is to strengthen the competitiveness 
of the European economy (EC, 2002b), which does 
not impose any national discrimination regarding 
funding destined to UIC projects. 
Second, hundreds of independent experts evaluate 
FP proposals on the basis of its scientific and tech-
nological merit (EC, 2002c) and not to any particular 
geographical distribution of the research actors or 
specific institutional sectors involved. 
Of course, many of the financial instruments are 
addressed to collaboration among partners, and UIC 
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in particular, because EU policy-making places high 
value on UIC, and concretely on joint research to 
foster two of the principles of a well-functioning 
European Research Area: strengthening research 
institutions and knowledge-sharing (EC, 2007). 
What seems true is that there are no targeted provi-
sions to counterbalance any possible consequences 
of a process of cumulative advantage in UIC, due to 
the Matthew effect and the other aforementioned 
specific reasons. If national disparities in UIC arise, 
they are likely to be related to the self-reinforcing 
nature of UIC rather than the context of the  
research.2 
Methodology and data 
We obtained in September 2007 a comprehensive 
database of research activities co-financed by FP6. 
While in principle FP6 caters for the planning period 
2002 to 2006, in practice research financed by FP6 
started slightly later and extended beyond this  
period.3 The database contains 8,861 distinct proj-
ects, for a total value of €15.8 billion, and a total of 
69,260 participations involving universities, private 
firms, public or private research centres and other 
organisations. This is a ‘live’ database constructed at 
the Directorate-General for Research, European 
Commission, for internal use. 
Given our focus on UIC, we narrowed down the  
database to a subset of projects with at least one uni-
versity and one firm. Additionally, in line with the 
primary focus of the FP, we confined our analysis to 
the EU’s 27 members (including Romania and  
Bulgaria, that properly speaking were associated 
countries during the time span of FP6). A field in the 
database included the nationality of the participant. 
After gaps adjustments (surprisingly minor, given 
the sheer size of the database) and checking  
inconsistencies in this field (against reported partici-
pant addresses), we were able to build national  
aggregates. 
EU member states were involved in 88% of the 
projects (7,829 projects) representing 91% of the 
total value (€14.5 billion). The rest were associated 
and third countries. As expected, 88 and 91 are high 
percentages, because EU member states are the main 
target population of FP6 participants. For descriptive 
purposes, Table 1 offers a country breakdown. 
Highest shares of participation in terms of number of 
UIC projects and budgets correspond logically and 
largely to largest countries. 
For member states, one third of the total number 
of projects (i.e. 2,400 projects) involved at least one 
university and one firm as participants. The value of 
projects involving UIC was €9.5 billion. The aver-
age value per UIC project was nearly €4 million in 
EU25, but with variations among countries ranging 
from €1.2 million for Romania to €4.76 million for 
Germany. 
In order to build indicators of the value of UIC 
across the EU, we constructed two very simple 
measures: 
Number of projects with 
UICi 
Share of number 
of projects with 
UICi 
= 
Total number of projectsi
(1)
 
Value of projects with 
UICi 
Share of number 
of projects with 
UICi  
= 
Total value of projectsi 
(2)
 
where i represents a given EU member state. The 
time period is the sum of years 2003 to 2007. First, 
we will compare indicator 1 against indicator 2, 
which should be logically correlated. Then, since 
they express the involvement of EU member states 
in UIC through the FP but not the absolute value of 
the FP projects, we also calculated: 
 
What seems true is that there are no 
targeted provisions to counterbalance 
any possible consequences of a process 
of cumulative advantage in university–
industry cooperation 
Table 1. Breakdown of UIC projects in the 6th EU R&D FP
EU member 
state 
% of number of UIC 
projects over total 
number of UIC 
projects 
% of value of UIC 
projects over total 
value of UIC projects
Austria 3% 4% 
Belgium 5% 5% 
Bulgaria 1% 0% 
Cyprus 0% 0% 
Czech Republic 2% 2% 
Denmark 2% 2% 
Estonia 0% 0% 
Finland 3% 3% 
France 6% 7% 
Germany 14% 15% 
Greece 5% 5% 
Hungary 2% 2% 
Ireland 3% 2% 
Italy 9% 10% 
Latvia 1% 1% 
Lithuania 0% 0% 
Luxembourg 0% 0% 
Malta 0% 0% 
Netherlands 5% 5% 
Poland 5% 4% 
Portugal 2% 2% 
Romania 1% 0% 
Slovakia 1% 0% 
Slovenia 1% 1% 
Spain 7% 7% 
Sweden 7% 8% 
United Kingdom 15% 15% 
Total 100% 100% 
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Value of projects with UICi Average value 
of projects  
with UICi 
= Number of projects with UICi
(3)
This is the indicator used to capture the ability of 
fund-raising from FP in a given country. We exam-
ine the possible association between this indicator 
and national wealth (per capita GDP). GDP data 
were downloaded in July 2008 from Eurostat’s 
online public database, expressed in purchasing 
power standards (PPS) at market prices, taking the 
average of years 2003 to 2007 as a reference. 
We will correlate indicator 3 with per capita 
GDP. A positive correlation would suggest that 
richer countries get projects of higher average fund-
ing than poorer countries. Of course, a more fine-
tuned analysis would also look for correlations with 
(gross, business and higher education) expenditures 
on R&D, but since R&D is positively associated 
with wealth too (Lederman and Maloney, 2003), the 
analysis of per capita GDP suffices to illustrate a 
first approach to the cumulative advantage of UIC. 
R&D variables, as discussed in the Conclusions, 
would be indispensable for a causal analysis beyond 
the scope of this research. 
However, one reason for a positive correlation be-
tween indicator 3 with per capita GDP could be the 
different national cost levels (researcher wages, 
price of capital goods, etc.) Ideally, we should then 
control for these costs. Although we do not have 
such a cost variable, we can use something as good. 
First, we calculate the following indicator of the 
value of projects that do not involve UIC: 
Value of projects without 
UICi 
Average value 
of projects  
without UICi  
= Number of projects without 
UICi 
(4)
Then, by dividing indicator 3 into indicator 4, we 
obtain a ratio that expresses the preference of proj-
ects with UIC over projects without UIC: 
Value of UIC projects relative to non-UIC  
projectsi  = 
Value of projects 
with UICi 
Value of projects 
without UICi 
Number of projects 
with UICi 
 
Number of projects 
without UICi 
(5)
A value equal to one for this ratio means that a  
country is raising the same funds for projects that 
involve UIC and other projects. If higher (lower) 
than one, the country will be getting more (less) 
funds out of UIC projects than of other projects. 
Looking at this ratio, we reduce differences in  
national cost levels somewhat. Then, by correlating 
this ratio with per capita GDP, we exert a kind of 
control of the simpler relation that could be found 
with indicator 3. 
We will call indicator 5 our crown indicator. In a 
second step, we will break the aggregate data for this 
indicator into the different components of the 6th 
EU R&D FP: specific programmes, thematic priori-
ties and instruments. Thus we will identify more 
homogenous measures of the indicator and verify the 
robustness of the aggregate results. 
Results 
A two-speed UIC pattern in the EU 
As can be seen in Figure 1, countries getting the 
lion’s share of UIC projects in terms of numbers and 
value are member states with higher per capita 
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Figure 1. Involvement of EU member states in UIC in the 6th EU R&D FP
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GDP: Germany, Austria, Italy and Sweden present 
high percentages for both number and value of UIC; 
Finland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Spain and France 
stand out in at least one out of the two indicators. 
Per capita GDP may well be reflecting higher R&D 
expenditures that make the difference. 
Countries with lower per capita GDP (Lithuania, 
Poland, Latvia, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia,  
Bulgaria, Estonia, Malta and Cyprus) tend to rank 
low in both the proportion of number and value of 
university–industry FP projects. Again, lower levels 
of R&D expenditure may be at stake, with the addi-
tional observation that the majority of these  
countries are new member states, with little experi-
ence in participating in FP projects, apart from other 
structural problems pertaining to the transition.4 
Therefore, to some extent, richer countries tend to 
engage into higher levels of UIC. However, the pat-
tern shows several exceptions: Richer countries such 
as Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland and United King-
dom do not engage in UIC as often as their EU15 
counterparts, while poorer countries such as the  
Czech Republic, Slovenia or Portugal have a higher 
average number of UIC contracts than the other new 
member states. The average value of FP6 projects 
offers a partial explanation of the exceptions. 
By dividing the value of FP6 projects by the 
number of FP6 projects, it is possible to build an 
indicator of the average value of FP6 projects, that 
is, indicator 3. It appears in the Y-axis of Figure 2. 
Despite being involved in low levels of UIC, proj-
ects in Denmark, Netherlands, United Kingdom and 
(to a lesser extent) Ireland have high average value. 
By contrast, despite being involved in high levels of 
UIC, projects in the Czech Republic, Slovenia or 
Portugal have low average value. 
The X-axis of Figure 2 shows national per capita 
GDP. The correlation with the average value of FP6 
projects is very high. This supports the idea that 
richer countries involved in UIC get more funds than 
poorer countries. 
Going back to Figure 1, it is possible to notice 
that the percentage of UIC project value over the 
total value is much higher: two thirds of the FP6 
funds in EU27 correspond to projects with UIC, 
even if UIC projects represent less than one third of 
the total number of projects. We will further explore 
this in the next section. 
The UIC preference before other forms  
of research co-operation 
If we now move to a comparison between indicators 
3 and 4, Figure 3 shows that, for the EU average, a 
UIC contract involves a funding four times bigger 
than other forms of collaboration. 
The higher average value of projects with UIC 
over projects without UIC is present for every mem-
ber state. It is possible to wonder whether the rela-
tion of one to another is always the same. To verify 
it, a good indicator is the ratio of the average value 
of projects with UIC over the average value of proj-
ects without UIC, that is, indicator 5. It expresses the 
degree of preference for the average value of proj-
ects with UIC over the average value of projects 
without UIC. Figure 4 shows the values for the EU 
and the member states and puts them in relation with 
per capita GDP. 
Once again, there is a clear relationship. Although 
FP6 budget allocation gives unambiguous preference 
to UIC projects, another gap between old and new 
member states appears with clarity. In countries with  
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higher per capita GPD, the value of UIC relative to 
non-UIC projects is higher than in countries with 
lower per capita GDP. This is to say, in relative 
terms, FP6 leads richer countries to reinforce the 
reliance of their research systems on UIC and poorer 
countries to reinforce the reliance of their research 
systems on other modalities of research. 
Robustness of the results (and increasing  
complexity): Breakdown by specific programmes, 
thematic priorities and instruments 
The measures of the FP data presented so far are the 
heterogeneous aggregation of different specific  
programmes and blocks of activities, so it can be 
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considered noisy. In order to test the robustness of 
the results, we broke down the data in the quest for 
more homogeneous and meaningful indicators. 
The clear positive slope of the regression line we 
could draw in Figure 4 finds its counterpart in the 
positive coefficient of correlation that we calculate 
for the FP6 overall, equal to 0.71, as Table 2 
shows. The label of the second column is ‘all spe-
cific programmes’ because the FP6 consists of 
three specific programmes and the following col-
umns present their breakdown: ‘Focusing and inte-
grating Community research’, ‘Structuring the 
ERA’ and ‘Euratom’. One can notice that the posi-
tive correlation persists in the three categories, 
which is a first sign of consistency of our results. 
The coefficients are smaller, though, which can be 
interpreted as if the overall higher correlation were 
due to somewhat independent minor effects in the 
same direction. 
The bulk of the projects belong to the first spe-
cific programme, ‘Focusing and integrating Com-
munity research’, so it is worth breaking it down for 
a further consistency check. It combines two types 
of activities: ‘Thematic priorities’ (close to a separa-
tion by scientific disciplines) and ‘Specific activities 
covering a wider field of research’ (which are of a 
more horizontal nature). UIC is concentrated in the 
‘Thematic priorities’, so this is where we perform 
our check. Table 3 reports the results. 
There are seven thematic priorities. We calculated 
correlation coefficients for each one of them. For a 
more condensed presentation of results, we grouped 
them into two categories: those with a positive sign 
and those with a negative sign. 
The first category actually involves almost exclu-
sively the largest thematic priority, ‘Information so-
ciety technologies’ (IST), with a small number of 
projects from the priority ‘Citizens and governance 
in a knowledge-based society’ and it is the main 
cause of the high correlation coefficient. In the rest 
of thematic priorities (other five, see footnotes of 
Table 3), the crown indicator has a negative correla-
tion with per capita GDP, suggesting a counter-
balancing effect, that is, a reduction of disparities in 
UIC across countries, although it is often not signifi-
cant if taken one by one. 
Thematic priorities can in turn be broken down 
into five financial instruments (see EC, 2002a for 
explanations, or EC, 2002b for an overview). We 
also grouped them into those with a positive and 
those with a negative correlation with per capita 
GDP. Only UIC projects implemented through one 
of these instruments — integrated projects (IP) — 
have the usual positive correlation. If crossed with 
thematic priorities, it changes the sign of the correla-
tion of thematic priorities other than IST with per 
capita GDP, from negative to positive, with a value 
of 13%. 
For the rest of the instruments (other four, see 
footnotes of Table 3), the negative correlation per-
sists, equal to –51%. Therefore, even if the overall 
effect is of increasing national disparities on UIC, 
Table 2. Crown indicator of average value of the 6th EU R&D FP UIC projects by specific programme 
Country All specific  
programmes 
Focusing and integrating 
Community research 
Structuring  
the ERA 
Euratom 
Austria 4.00 2.51 6.64 0.43 
Belgium 3.65 2.22 4.99 3.47 
Bulgaria 3.23 2.54 5.31 2.41 
Cyprus 4.36 2.15 6.23 1.39 
Czech Republic 2.71 2.03 3.87 1.68 
Denmark 4.17 2.49 3.26 3.28 
Estonia 3.55 2.65 3.76 1.05 
Finland 3.18 2.26 3.49 1.35 
France 4.79 2.55 5.79 2.05 
Germany 3.81 2.43 4.02 3.09 
Greece 4.18 2.21 3.87 0.87 
Hungary 3.29 1.90 4.59 1.04 
Ireland 4.51 2.69 2.89 1.93 
Italy 3.91 2.22 4.92 2.28 
Latvia 3.32 3.21 2.19  
Lithuania 2.68 1.80 3.47 2.95 
Malta 2.88 2.91 1.17  
Netherlands 4.36 2.36 5.11 2.37 
Poland 3.21 2.25 3.77 1.13 
Portugal 3.54 2.32 4.57 0.58 
Romania 2.14 1.54 3.04 1.49 
Slovakia 3.69 2.70 6.02 2.56 
Slovenia 2.50 1.72 3.54 0.99 
Spain 5.41 2.30 7.85 2.59 
Sweden 4.21 2.51 3.40 1.48 
United Kingdom 5.19 2.42 4.44 1.29 
Number of projects 2,400 2,184 184 32 
% projects 100% 91% 8% 1% 
Correlation with GDP 71% 26% 24% 22% 
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some thematic priorities and instruments of the FP 
run in the opposite direction.4 By contrast, if we 
cross the four progressive instruments with the  
thematic priority of IST, positive correlations per-
sist, suggesting a quite robust effect of IST on in-
creasing disparities on UIC. More specific studies 
on the IST sector in the FP6 go in line with this 
evidence when they suggest that ‘the presence of 
hubs in a region raises disproportionately the con-
nectivity of the region with others’ (Cassi et al, 
2008: 292).5 
Conclusions and suggestions for  
future research 
Ancient Greek architects considered the optical ef-
fect according to which the columns in the peristyle 
of temples had to be inclined in order to seem 
straight when viewers looked at them from a dis-
tance. Building completely vertical columns would 
have paradoxically produced the opposite effect — 
they would have looked inclined. The Matthew ef-
fect and other reasons for cumulative advantage in 
UIC produce a somewhat similar result: when the 
promotion of UIC tries to be neutral, it generates 
disparities; in order to be really neutral, complemen-
tary interventions would be needed to support the 
conditions for UIC in countries where they depart 
from a lower basis.7 
Neutrality, though, is a matter of political choice, 
with supporters and detractors. The latter would ar-
gue that accumulation is not necessarily bad. A less 
polemic concern is that entry barriers should be 
minimal. If some countries face too high entry costs 
in UIC, we could be in the presence of a system fail-
ure, potentially detrimental for the long-term co-
hesion of European research. 
Which could these entry barriers be? The relation-
ship between a country’s wealth and UIC activity is 
 
Ancient Greek architects considered 
the optical effect according to which 
the columns in the peristyle of temples 
had to be inclined in order to seem 
straight when viewers looked at them 
from a distance 
Table 3. Crown indicator of average value of the 6th EU R&D FP UIC projects – specific programme ‘Focusing and integrating 
Community research’ by thematic priority and instrument 
Country Information society 
technologies * 
Rest of thematic priorities **
Integrated projects 
Rest of thematic priorities **
Other instruments *** 
Austria 2.75 1.88 1.28 
Belgium 2.71 1.09 2.04 
Bulgaria 2.00 0.81 2.33 
Cyprus 1.90 3.92 2.11 
Czech Republic 1.62 1.63 1.32 
Denmark 1.98 1.79 1.26 
Estonia 1.67 1.18 3.45 
Finland 2.76 0.74 1.37 
France 2.66 1.39 1.32 
Germany 2.37 1.13 1.40 
Greece 1.84 1.05 1.56 
Hungary 1.83 1.36 1.56 
Ireland 2.81 1.77 1.60 
Italy 2.05 0.99 1.35 
Latvia 1.51 1.39 5.48 
Lithuania 1.37 1.07 3.16 
Malta 2.10 1.48 2.55 
Netherlands 2.45 1.13 1.30 
Poland 2.03 1.22 1.77 
Portugal 1.96 2.91 1.88 
Romania 1.46 0.78 1.31 
Slovakia 1.94 0.95 2.41 
Slovenia 1.24 0.81 1.86 
Spain 2.23 1.27 1.23 
Sweden 1.85 1.25 1.34 
United Kingdom 2.21 1.06 1.45 
Number of projects 708 329 807 
% projects 29% 14% 34% 
Correlation with GDP 75% 13% –51% 
Notes:  * It also includes two projects of ‘Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society’ 
** Life sciences, genomics and biotechnology for health; Nanotechnologies and nanosciences, knowledge-based multifunctional 
materials and new production processes and devices; Aeronautics and space; Food quality and safety; Sustainable 
development, global change and ecosystems 
*** Networks of excellence; Specific targeted research projects; Coordination actions; Specific support actions 
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not simple — and we are not claiming here a direct 
causal link. Among other things, wealthier countries 
tend to have a longer historical experience with, and 
spend more on, R&D. Additional reasons relating to 
institutional differences and sectoral specialisations 
may also play a role. 
For instance, it may be that leading countries have 
learnt how to alleviate tensions between university 
and industry. Ongoing research shows successful 
stories in leading countries regarding the creation of 
joint research centres (Rohrbeck and Arnold, 2006; 
Andrisano et al, 2006), cooperation with local ser-
vice providers (Monypenny, 2007) and engagement 
with research on emerging technologies (Xiao, 
2008). It would be worth studying if the faster de-
velopment of these instruments and practices in per-
ipheral countries could help reducing disparities due 
to UIC. 
Actually, weak UIC links in Central and Eastern 
European countries may be due to the poor research 
capabilities in universities, which are mainly teach-
ing institutions — not a problem per se, if they can 
develop and teach entrepreneurial courses that are 
relevant to industry or help promote entrepreneur-
ship indirectly. But this development is actually very 
rare, because there is little relevance/demand for that 
in some countries, and that can be a problem (Ranga 
and Etzkowitz, 2010). One may also wonder 
whether the number of conflicts related to the ambi-
guity of ‘Third Mission’ indicators (Molas-Gallart 
and Castro-Martínez, 2007) is also higher in these 
contexts. 
Further research would be needed on whether a 
juste retour effect biases our data, and adds to the 
Matthew effect and other reasons in creating cumu-
lative advantage. Since FP evaluators are thousands 
and do not give credit to projects according to geo-
graphic criteria, if a juste retour logic exists, it must 
be self-organic. It would explain part of our results: 
those member states that give more money to the 
EC, get more funds in return from the FP. However, 
our results do not show that yet — controlling for 
more factors through an econometric analysis would 
be necessary.8 
Our results should not be seen as a normative ap-
praisal of the FP: the FP is designed to fulfil the goal 
of industrial competitiveness, and comprehensive 
evaluations that go beyond the scope of this article 
can be found elsewhere (Marimon, 2004; Rietschel, 
2009). Our reading of the results is that if promoted 
under the criteria of scientific excellence, UIC in the 
form of joint research might increase national dis-
parities because of the cumulative advantage in UIC 
and not because of the bad design of the instruments. 
We believe that this property will apply not only to 
FP data but to other data, and not only to EU finan-
cial instruments but also to national instruments 
among regions within a country. And we have seen 
that it is possible to nurture concrete thematic priori-
ties and instruments with a progressive effect on 
UIC even if the whole design favours a regressive 
effect. Complementary interventions by instruments 
that support capacity-building and equality of oppor-
tunity would seem a sensible policy choice. At an 
EU level this is — to an extent — already addressed 
by cohesion instruments. The present study, though, 
highlights the value of tailoring such instruments to 
UIC-related capabilities and doing so in a magnitude 
that is comparable to the FP. In that respect the re-
orientation of EU Structural Funds to better serve 
Europe’s ambition to transform into a knowledge-
based economy present an invaluable opportunity. 
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Notes 
1. This is a reference to a recent work that complements with 
case studies and updates previous reviews by Martin et al 
(1996), Salter and Martin (2001) and Scott et al (2002). 
2. Notice that this does not imply a causal interpretation, which 
would require controlling for other factors that cause national 
disparities in R&D potential, such as R&D resources, the insti-
tutional and legal framework, etc. 
3. The first project commenced in February 2003 and all but one 
project had commenced by December 2007. Project durations 
were distributed as follows: 699 (one year or less), 7,867 (be-
tween just over one and four years) and 295 (greater than four 
years). 
4. A widespread belief is that, moreover, in many cases, institu-
tions from Central and East European countries are invited to 
join a project just to increase the chances of success of the 
proposal rather than based on the expectation of a substantial 
contribution to the project. As argued in the section ‘Context of 
the research’ and further discussed in the Conclusions, there 
are no substantial reasons to support that statement, which is 
anyway not necessary to motivate the existence of cumulative 
advantage in UIC. 
5. The academic audience of this article may be curious to know 
that the popular instrument ‘Networks of Excellence’ (NoE) is 
among those with a progressive effect, although the number of 
NoE projects with UIC is small. 
6. Within the hypothesis explaining the high correlation found in 
the IST sector, we could point at its distributed and systemic 
nature which, more than any other sectors, requires across-
the-board collaboration on an international basis (equipment 
manufacturers, network operators, etc.). 
7. And who should be the architect to incline the columns in this 
case? The possible instruments, modalities and side-effects of 
such policies are beyond the scope of this article. What we 
have hopefully demonstrated here is the need for more policy 
attention and academic research. 
8. The findings of studies on overall (i.e. not just UIC) participa-
tion to the FP can provide some hints. Using data on FP3, Ge-
una (1998) finds that university participation was determined 
by scientific research productivity, size and differences among 
countries and scientific fields. A recent study on the determi-
nants of FP6 participation of leading European universities 
also finds that indicators of scientific output are major determi-
nants but detects neither a juste retour nor a cohesion logic 
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(Henriques et al, 2009). These studies though do not take into 
account the role of industry (much less UIC), leaving ample 
room for further study. 
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